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COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION:
THE INTERACTION OF RACE AND SEX
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
ELAINE V. SHOBEN*
The courts have not yet clearly resolved whether Title VII of the Cicil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits compound discrimination, that is, discrimination based on a com-
bination of protected characteristics-such as race and sex-rather than single
protected characteristics-such as race alone or sex alone. Professor Shoben argues
that both the logic and the legislative history of Title I'll support the clew that
compound discrimination is separately protected. She then offers a systematic
method for statistically determining whether an employer is discriminating on the
basis of a combination of characteristics. Finally, Professor Shoben considers
whether single plaintiffs can, consistently with rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Ckil
Procedure, adequately represent the claims of all class members wien both com-
pound and double discrimination are alleged. She concludes that courts should cer-
tify such classes and reserve subclassing until actual conflicts of interest arise be-
tween class representatives and other class members.
INTRODUCTION
In the sixteen years since Title VII' became effective, the courts
have answered the most fundamental questions concerning the stat-
ute's coverage, and current litigation in this maturing body of law has
begun to address more complex problems. We now know that Title
VII prohibits not only intentional forms of employment discrimination
but also practices that disproportionately exclude groups protected by
the Act unless business necessity can be demonstrated.' Further,
the Supreme Court has said that such "impact analysis" applies to sex
discrimination as well as to race discrimination. 3 One of the prob-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A.B., 1970. Bar-
nard College; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings College of Law. The author would
like to thank Susan Bryant Drake, J.D., 1978, University of Illinois. for her invaluable contribu-
tions to the concepts in this Article.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Ceneral Accounting Office
Personnel Act of 1980, § 8(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (Vest Supp. I. 19S0) (originally enacted
as Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6. Pub. L No. 63-M.. Title
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)). Title VII provides, in part, that it is an unlawful employment
practice for an employer having fifteen or more employees who is "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," id. § 2000e(b), to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex. or
national origin," id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
2 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Courts apply a different standard to claims based on disparate treat-
ment. See note 8 infra.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (19i 7.
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lems surfacing as Title VII litigation matures is whether individuals
who fall under two of the Act's protected categories, such as black
women, may obtain relief by demonstrating discrimination against
their compound category. In other words, must a black woman plain-
tiff establish race and sex discrimination by separate proof or does the
Act recognize that discrimination against black women may be a
problem that is distinct from discrimination against blacks or against
women alone? 4
Some individuals experience "double discrimination" in employ-
ment. A victim of double discrimination is one who belongs to two
different groups, both of which are adversely affected by an em-
ployer's practices.' For example, a police department's hiring proce-
' The Department of Labor regulations concerning equal employment opportunity In
apprenticeship programs, for example, recognize that single goals in affirmative action for
women and for minorities can result in the underrepresentation of some minority women even
if the separate single goals are met. These Regulations on Nondiscrimination in Apprenticeship
provide that such an underrepresentation may require the establishment of separate goals If a
specific minority group of women is underutilized, even though the sponsor had achieved its
standards generally. 29 C.F.R. § 30.4(f) (1980).
Similarly, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) Revised Order
No. 4, Affirmative Action Guidelines, provide that separate goals by sex for minority groups
may be required if there is a substantial disparity in the utilization of men or women of a
particular minority group. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(1) (1980).
Conversely, the effect of affirmative action plans at many companies may be to Improve the
relative position of minority women, but to leave minority men and women as a whole lagging.
One recent study found that the wages of minority women have climbed dramatically during
the last 20 years to virtual equivalence with the wages of white women, whereas minority
women still lag behind minority men. Similarly, white women still are behind white men, and
minority men are behind white males. Smith, The Convergence to Racial Equality in Women's
Wages (Rand Paper Series No. 6026, March 1978).
' In a number of cases plaintiffs have claimed double discrimination. See, e~g., Caballah v.
Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1980) (national origin discrimination and religious dis-
crimination alleged but not proven); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d
711, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (allegations of discrimination because of sex and husband's Arabic
ancestry); Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1326-27, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978) (claims of
race and sex discrimination without adequate class representation); Powell v, Syracuse Univ.,
580 F.2d 1150, 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978) (black woman alleged that
whites and males given preferred treatment); Hicks v. ABT Assocs., 572 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir.
1978) (white male claimed race and sex discrimination); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976) (allegations of both
race and sex discrimination against blacks and females); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employ-
ment Serv., 488 F. Supp. 239, 256-57 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (race and sex discrimination alleged
but not proven); Mahroom v. Alexander, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. T 30,580 (C.D, Cal, 1979)
(national origin discrimination and sex discrimination alleged but not proven by Iraqi female);
EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 158 (N.D. I11. 1979) (allegations of sex
discrimination and national origin discrimination against a Jewish woman); Coley v. M & M
Mars, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (allegations of race and sex discrimination
by discharged black women); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 678, 679
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (allegations of race discrimination and male gender discrimination in clerical
jobs); Smith v. University of N.C., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 913, 915, 917 (M.D.N.C. 1978)
(religion, age, and sex discrimination claims by woman who was former Roman Catholic sister).
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dure may include both a written test that disproportionately excludes
blacks and a minimum height requirement that adversely affects
women. In that instance, a black woman has a double disadvantage in
her application. 6  If she wishes to challenge both of these practices
she may bring two Tide VII claims, one for race discrimination and
one for sex discrimination, joined in one action.7
The effects of exclusionary practices are not always so neatly
dichotomized, however. Assume that this hypothetical police depart-
ment has a third hiring requirement, an oral interview in which ap-
plicants are rated subjectively on qualities such as resourcefulness,
commanding presence, integrity, and so forth. This third requirement
6 When an individual fills out a "Charge of Discrimination" form for the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), he or she must indicate the cause of the claimed
discrimination; the choices are race, color, sex, religion, and national origin. There are no
instructions on this part of the form, but next to each of these terms there is an empty square
box, so the individual is presumably expected to check the cause or causes of the claimed
discrimination. 2 EEO Compl. Man. (P-H) 92,401. Filing a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC is a jurisdictional requirement for a Title VII claim in a federal district court. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), so not surprisingly, difficulties have arisen when plaintiffs later have
attempted to claim different or additional causes of discrimination in court. If a Mexican-
American woman indicates "sex" as the basis of the discrimination against her, for example. may
she then allege national origin discrimination in her Title VII complaint? This problem %%as
addressed in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970). in which the Fifth
Circuit set forth the now widely followed rule that the allegations in the complaint to the
district court may encompass any kind of discrimination "like or related" to the allegation in the
EEOC charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the EEOC investiga-
tion. Id. at 466 (quoting King v. Ceorgia Power Co.. 295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ca. 1963)?.
See, e.g., Hicks v. ABT Assocs., 572 F.2d 960, 964 (3d Cir. 1978), Jenkins V. Blue Cross Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168-69 (7th Cir. 1976); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 447
F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir. 1971).
7 For similar cases, see, e.g., Smith v. Tro)an. 520 F.2d 492. 497-98 (6fli Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (height requirement adversely "affected women testing requirement
affected blacks and women); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Conm'n. 393 F. Supp. 378. 351.
382 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (height requirement adversely -affected Asians. Hispanics. and womem
agility test affected women), 473 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (settlement approvedl. United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 622-23, 6-27 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (written exam had
disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics; height requirement affected female and HtspankO.
In another factually related case, Collins v. City of Los Angeles. 18 Fair Empl Prec. Cas.
594 (C.D. Cal. 1978), a black woman unsuccessfully challenged the hiring practices of the Los
Angeles Police Department after she was terminated from the training academy. Sie presnted
inconclusive statistical proof, the court said, of "a lesser graduation rate for blacks than %bites
and for females as against males and for black females as against white females.- Id. at 595. It si
unclear why the comparison of black women would be juxtaposed against white women as
opposed to black men, white men, or all three. The court did not have otvasion to apply a more
rigorous analysis to the statistics because they were apparently being offered only as support for
a disparate treatment claim, and the court found no intentional discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas v. Green standard. Id. at 595-96; see McDonnell Douglas Cori). %. Green.
411 U.S. 792 (1973); note 26 infra.
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may not have any disparate impact' on any group defined by race or
sex, but it is possible that black women as a separate group are dis-
proportionately excluded. This may be so even though black men and
white women score exceptionally well in the oral interview." Subtle
or explicit stereotypes about the characteristics of black women may
disadvantage that particular group. Such discrimination against black
women is premised neither on race nor on sex; it results from an
interaction of these two characteristics and can be called "compound
discrimination." 10 It is not double discrimination, as defined pre-
viously, because there is no discriminatory effect attributable to race
alone or to sex alone.
A black female plaintiff challenging the hiring practices of the
hypothetical police department may wish to challenge all three re-
quirements, not only the first two.' The written test has a disparate
' Title VII claims based upon "disparate impact" should be distinguished from claims of
"unequal treatment," which is also often called "disparate treatment." The similarity In the
names of these dissimilar theories of recovery under Title VII is the unfortunate result of hap-
hazard nomenclature since neither of these terms is defined by, nor even appears In, tle Act
itself. "Disparate treatment" has been used to mean an employer's unequal policy or practice
which differentiates between two groups solely on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. A disparate treatment claim requires proof of the employer's discriminatory
intent, although sometimes intent can be inferred from the facts showing inequality in treat-
ment. On the other hand, "disparate impact" concerns the discriminatory results of neutral
practices without regard to the employer's intent. The terms "disparate impact," "adverse im-
pact," and "disproportionate exclusion" are used synonymously. See International Bihd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co,, 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971); Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711-18
(4th Cir. 1979).
9 For an interesting recent case on the separate effect of an oral interview, see Ilarless v.
Duck, 619 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1980). Harless was a sex discrimination case in which both tie
employer's oral interview and physical ability test were found to have a disparate impact oi
women. Id. at 616-17. The interview was found to suffer from "lack of standardized conditions,
rater bias, and the lack of criteria on which to judge the degree of correctness or answers." Id.
at 617. Two written intelligence tests, however, did not have a disparate impact on women. Id.
On the use of subjective hiring standards, see generally B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment
Discrimination Law 166-81 (1976); id. Supp. at 44-46; Stacy, Subjective Criteria In Employment
Decisions Under Title VII, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 737 (1976).
10 "Compound discrimination" is defined here as the interaction of any two groups covered
by Title VII, not just race and sex interactions.
" The author of one book concerning the implementation of equal opportunity laws de-
scribes the "hypothetical applicant most likely to send chills of terror" through a personnel
manager. Such an applicant would be "an over-forty female Negro atheist born outside the
United States, with limited education and a slight physical handicap," D. Peskin, The Building
Blocks of EEO 200 (1971). The chills caused by such an applicant apparently result from tihe
fear that if the applicant is rejected she could allege numerous violations of the nation's employ-
ment discrimination law. The unlawful employment practices provision of Title VII (codified tit
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976)) covers three possible dimensions: race/color/national origin, reli-
gion, and sex. Other federal acts provide other protected dimensions such as age, physical
handicap, and veteran status. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. 29 U.S.C. §
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 55:793
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796 1980
COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION
impact on blacks, and the height requirement disproportionately ex-
cludes women. The third hurdle, the oral interview, presents no ex-
clusionary barrier to blacks or to women as separate groups, but any
black woman who gets this far has a very low probability of being
hired. If compound discrimination is covered by Title VII, evidence
of the disparate impact of the third requirement on black women
would shift the burden to the defendant to demonstrate the validity
of the interview requirement.'
Compound discrimination can most readily be understood as the
result of a specific requirement that adversely affects only the com-
pound class, such as the oral interview requirement in the hypothet-
ical police department. However, compound discrimination may
coexist with single-dimension discrimination. For example, an oral in-
terview may discriminate on a single-dimension basis against both
blacks and women. It may also discriminate on a compound basis
against black women if the proportion of black women excluded by
the oral interview is greater than may reasonably be explained by the
cumulative effect of race and sex discrimination. 3
Few courts thus far have addressed squarely the issue of com-
pound discrimination; those that have considered compound claims
by black women have come to opposite conclusions about the scope
of the Act's coverage.14  The issue requires more careful examination
621 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976 & Supp. IIl
1979); Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The problem, however, may be that this hypothetical applicants "choice" of grounds of
discrimination may actually result in no single ground for a claim. In Jefleries v. Harris County
Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, a plaintiffalleged that she
was discriminated against in promotion "'because she is a woman, up in age and because she is
Black."' Id. at 1029. She had difficulties in proof with these single dimension claims, however.
and sought to prove the interactive effect of at least two of the dimensions, race and sex. Id. at
1029-30.
12 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); note 26 infra.
13 The statistical method of proof described in this Article, see text accompanying notes
99-105 infra, is designed to measure the impact on the compound group as a separate protected
category. It is not equivalent to "adding" the impact of discrimination on two or more single-
dimension grounds.
" Compare Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 10-25, 1032 (5th
Cir. 1980) (district court improperly failed to consider black woman's claim on ie hasis ofboth
race and sex, not just race or sex alone) with Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div.,
413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Miss. 1976), affd in part, revd in part, and remanded on other
grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (1977) (black women are not a special class protected by Title VII; blk-
-women could assert claims for race discrimination or sex discrimination or both, but not for a
combination of both).
In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969). affd in releant part per
curiam, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971), the court allowed a class of black women to bring a
claim against an employer without discussion of whether theirs was a protected class. The de-
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than it has received in the past, especially since it is inherent in the
claims of reverse discrimination brought by an increasing number of
white men. Courts addressing reverse discrimination claims generally
have assumed without discussion that the compound category of
white males is protected by the Act.'3 The absence of analysis leaves
open the added question whether acts of discrimination against com-
pound categories are prohibited only when they are intentional, or
whether practices that disproportionately exclude compound groups
also are covered by the Act.
This Article argues that overt discriminatory practices against
compound groups have already been recognized as covered by the
Act and that absent a showing of business necessity, Title VII also
prohibits unintentionally discriminatory practices adversely affecting
compound groups. Further, this Article offers specific statistical
methods for proving double and compound discrimination. These
methods are designed to avoid false findings or disparate impact that
may unfairly require employers to defend their practices. Restricting
the number of compound permutations would provide an additional
safeguard; black men should be covered by the Act, but statistical
evidence could be misleading if, for example, old black Catholic men
are recognized as a subgroup of black men. Finally, this Article
explores problems of class representation in double and compound dis-
crimination cases. In the hypothetical police department case, for ex-
ample, a court might not permit a black female to represent a com-
bined class of blacks, women, and black women because of problems
of commonality, typicality, and conflict. The Article concludes that
establishing subclasses may be necessary in some cases, but in many
cases subclassing is best deferred until actual conflicts of interest
appear at the relief stage of litigation.
fendant employed whites of both sexes and black males, but not black females. The court found
that the employment practices intentionally excluded black females. Id. at 101-03.
," See, e.g., IBEW, Local 35 v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 417-18, 124-25 (2d Cir.
1980) (aflirmative action plan favoring racial and ethnic minorities and women upheld against
claim of discrimination against nonminority union members); Jurgens v. Norton, 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 699, 700 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (certification of a class of white male professional em-
ployees granted in Title VII action). See also Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D.
289 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (motion by Anglo male employees to intervene denied following entry of
consent decree in case brought on behalf of minorities and females, but motion granted to
modify the decree to apply to all employees).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
(Vol. 55:793
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 798 1980
COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION
I
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
COMPOUND GROUPS
A. Overt and Reverse Discrimination:
Compound Groups
The clearest case of a discriminatory employment practice pro-
hibited by Title VII is one in which an employer defendant has dem-
onstrated an "evil motive" by some overt act. The statement that
"blacks need not apply" is a classic example, for it presents direct
evidence of intentional discrimination.' 6  Comparable discrimination
against a compound category would take the form of a statement in-
dicating the deliberate exclusion of, for instance, "black chicks." '- A
claim of reverse discrimination similarly is based on a claim that an
employer has purposely given preference to minority groups and
women to the exclusion of the compound group of white males.,
The relevant portion of the Act provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." ' 9 The last "or" which separates the prohibited bases
of distinction presents a problem of interpretation. The conjunction
"or" can be used additively, as in "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges"; it can also create alternatives, as in "to fail or refuse."
If the "or" in the list of protected classes is considered additive, then
compound groups (e.g., black females) should be covered by the Act.
If it is considered alternative, then each category is presumably ex-
clusive of the others (e.g., blacks or females) and compound groups
are not covered by the Act."
16 See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Con-
cept of Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1972).
17 Cf. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979) (sexual favors sought from
"black chick" employee): Vuyanich v. Republic Natl Bank, 409 F. Supp. 10S3. 10S5 (N.D. Tex.
1976) (claim of race and sex discrimination after black female employee allegedly was told by
supervisor that she probably did not need a job because her husband %as a Caucasian).
11 Such preference is usually given in the implementation of an affirmative action plan. See
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). See also Hunter v. St. Louis-San
Francisco By., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1601 (8th Cir. 1981) (no violation of Title V11 when
white female applicant for railroad fireman job was rejected in favor of black males favored on
the basis of race under an affirmative action plan); Schwartz v. Florida. 23 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 203 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (race and sex discrimination found when white female was rejected
for job in favor of black male at formerly all black state university).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
The categories of race and national origin are grouped together for purposes of this
discussion on the assumption that individuals in modem America would classify themselves
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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One federal court has concluded that the "or" is additive: "The
use of the word 'or' evidences Congress' intent to prohibit employ-
ment discrimination based on any or all of the listed
characteristics.""1  The intent of Congress on this issue is not so
readily discernible, however. The different functions of "or" within
the Act's key prohibitory provisions prevent any conclusion about the
drafters' use of the word, and the legislative history on the question
is equally inconclusive. The defeat of an amendment that would have
added "solely" before "because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin" is noteworthy,u but probably refers to
problems of causation rather than to the specific categories of prohib-
ited discrimination. More importantly, some comments made during
debate on the addition of "sex" to the prohibited categories indicate
that Congress considered the particular plight of black women. For
example, Representative Frances Bolton noted that the prohibition of
employment discrimination on the basis of sex "affects very deeply
Negro women who, perhaps, are at the small end of the horn in a
great many of these areas."O Senator Humphrey pointed out that
along one or the other of these dimensions but not both. Discrimination against Mexican-
Americans is generally considered national origin discrimination, for example, although this
group might also be described in racial or color terms. Similarly, discrimination against blacks is
considered racial discrimination, although historically this racial dimension was clearly related to
national origin. The absence of Title VII definitions contributes to the confusion. See Espinoza
V. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (national origin discrimination under Title VII does
not include discrimination on the basis of citizenship).
Similarly, the term "color" under Title VII appears to have no meaning separate from race
or national origin. See Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 984 (1978) (complaint alleged discrimination on basis of "race, color, and sex" but only
race and sex discussed); Gomez v. Pima County, 426 F. Supp. 816 (D. Ariz. 1976) (discussion of
"color" discrimination in employment in a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Until recent-
ly the EEOC combined "race and color" as one unit on the Charge of Discrimination form, but
a revision of EEOC Form 5 separates race and color as two separate possible causes of discrim-
ination. See 2 EEO CompI. Man. (P-H) 92,401. If individuals using the new charge form
specify only color as the cause of discrimination against them, there may be future litigation
clarifying the difference, if any, between race and color under Title VII.
21 Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Jefferies court was considering a claim brought by a black woman alleging discrimination
based on "a combination of race and sex." Id.
22 See 110 Cong. Rec. 2728 (1964).
21 Id. at 2720. Similarly, Representative Martha Griffiths considered situations in which
black women or white women might be unable to remedy discrimination against them If only
race were covered by the Act. Id. at 2579. A black woman dishwasher from a greasy spoon
down the street, she noted, would have difficulty applying for a job dishwashing at a fancy
restaurant with only white male dishwashers if the restaurant claimed that it only wanted men
as dishwashers. She would have to prove race discrimination, presumably by convincing the
trier of fact that she would have been rejected even if she were a black man rather than a black
woman. A white woman applying for a job at such a restaurant could not succeed in proving
race discrimination because all the dishwashers are white. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol, 55:793
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 800 1980
COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION
"[o]nly two percent of white women who have graduated from high
school but not completed college are domestic workers, but fully 20
percent of Negro women with this much education find only domestic
work."'  Again referring to the special problems of black women,
the Senator noted that "[o]ne in every three white women workers is
employed in a clerical job; for Negro women the figure is one in
nine." "
These references to problems of discrimination against compound
categories suggest that Congress assumed that adding sex to the cate-
gories of prohibited discrimination would forbid at least intentional
exclusions of compound groups. A few decisions in intentional dis-
crimination cases" appear to make the same assumption. It is not
critical for a plaintiff to prove that intentional discrimination has
occurred because of only one dimension of the person's racial, ethnic,
or sexual identity. 27  Indeed, some cases even reach three-
dimensional claims by including religion or age. Individual claims
have included intentional discrimination against an old female with a
Id. at 6547 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
SId. at 6548.
The order of proof for an individual claim of disparate treatment %as explained by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Creen, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Those require-
ments are: "(i) that [plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer %%-as seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications. he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id. at 802. Once the
plaintiff has established these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. These requirements are
not restricted to discrimination claims based on membership in a racial minority. See. e.g.,
Lujan v. New Mexico Health and Social Servs. Dept. 624 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1950) (national
origin discrimination application of McDonnell Douglas criteria); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic
Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979) (sex discrimination application of McDonnell Douglas
criteria). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the McDonnell Douglas criteria were "never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters. 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978).
" A number of discrimination cases have assumed without discussion that allegations of
intentional compound discrimination state a claim under the Act. See Rohler v. TRW. Inc., 576
F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1978) (sex and age discrimination claim alleging young females and males of
all ages given preference); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (Italian Catholic lawyer alleged national origin and religious discrimination in promotion
by law firm). See also Phoebe v. State Div. of Human Rights, 70 A.D.2d 862, 418 N.Y.S.2d 55
(App. Div. 1979) (racial and religious discrimination against Black Muslim woman found under
New York Human Rights Law).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1980]
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 801 1980
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
foreign accent and against a homosexual Jewish man. 9  Such claims
fail frequently for lack of evidence or because the employer demon-
strates a legitimate business purpose for the adverse employment
decision.' Nonetheless, it appears to be taken for granted that the
Act covers intentional discrimination against such categories. Similar-
ly, white males are treated as a category protected from intentional
exclusion unless exclusion is permitted by a bona fide affirmative ac-
tion plan."' That the category in question is a compound one has
never been considered relevant to the discussion in these cases.
From the meager legislative history and the assumptions made by the
courts,3" it appears that the Act's protection extends at least to inten-
tional acts of employment discrimination directed toward compound
groups.
B. The Sex-Plus Analogy
Another argument supporting the view that Title VII prohibits
intentional discrimination against compound groups relies on the
principles of "sex-plus" discrimination. Sex-plus discrimination occurs
when a hiring practice, while not explicitly directed at a particular
sex, operates to exclude only one sex. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.," the Supreme Court held that a rule that could be stated in
2 In Zell v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1979), a 57-year-old female who was
Czechoslovakia-born alleged that she was denied a promotion because of sex, national origin,
and age discrimination. Id. at 357. The court found no intentional discrimination on the basis of
sex, age, or national origin, and found that the plaintiff was not qualified for the job. Id. at 360.
It further determined that the defendant's promotion procedures had no "disparate Impact on
female employees, elderly employees, foreign-born employees, or elderly female employees
who are foreign-born or have foreign accents." Id. This suggests that if the plaintiff had pro-
duced convincing statistical evidence of an adverse impact on the compound group of elderly
foreign-born females, the court might have found a prima facie case. Age discrimination Is
prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976 & Supp. II
1978), which is modeled after the proscriptions in Title VII.
2 See Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (Jewish male homosexual
alleged that his job was terminated because of his race, religion, and sexual preference).
w See, e.g., id. (legitimate business reason found for discharge in case alleging nice, reli-
gion, and sexual preference discrimination against homosexual Jewish man); Zell v, United
States, 472 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (older foreign-born female found not qualified for
promotion).
" See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-01 (1979); IBEW, Local 35 v. City
of Hartford, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1786, 1792-93 (2d Cir. 1980); Detroit Police Officers'
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 690 (6th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.LW. 3466
(U.S. Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 79-1080); Jurgens v. Norton, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1738, 1739-40
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
1 See cases cited in notes 30-31 supra. See also Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp, 97
(M.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971)
(intentional discrimination against black women found without discussion of whether this group
by itself was protected by the Act).
- 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
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neutral terms violates the Act if the rule is applied to only one sex,
unless the employer can demonstrate that the rule is a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).2 Martin Marietta had a rule
against hiring female applicants with preschool-age children,".
although men with preschool children were considered and hired.
The rule applied only to a subset of persons with preschool children,
and that subset was entirely women.3 It is noteworthy that there
was no evidence in Phillips that the employer's practices otherwise
had an adverse impact on women as a class. In fact, 70-75% of the
applicants for the assembly-trainee position in question were women,
and 75-80% of those hired were women.Y The disparate treatment'
of women with preschool-aged children was the only issue.
The Fifth Circuit was impressed with the analogy between sex-
plus discrimination and compound discrimination. In Jefferies v.
Harris County Community Action Association,' it noted" the line of
sex-plus cases holding that an employer may not establish unqualified
rules excluding women with young children,4 married women, ' or
women who are single and pregnant.4A The court found it inconceiv-
able that the subclass of women-plus-black would not similarly be
protected." If sex plus a neutral category is covered by the Act, the
reasoning goes, then sex plus a protected category must be covered.
This analogy is appealing, but not as helpful as it initially appears
to be. Sex-plus analysis merely attempts to determine whether an
employer has created a category that unlawfully operates against a
group protected by the Act. An employer may not treat differently
any group covered by the Act. It is already known that women are
protected by the Act, so the sex-plus question is whether a rule
against marriage applied only to women discriminates against women.
In contrast, it is not already known that compound categories are
Id. at 544. Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's -indication" that Martin Marietta
should have an opportunity to establish that women "with pre-school-age children have family
responsibilities that interfere with job performance and that men do not usually have such
responsibilities." Id. at 544. (Marshall. J., concurring). Justice Marshall would have rtquired
gender neutral application of the employment criterion at issue in Phillips. Id. at 544-45. 547.
I Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
For a discussion of the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact analy
sis under Title VII, see note 8 supra.
615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
4 Id. at 1034.
' Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 t7th Cir.). cert. denied. 404 UIS. 991
(1971).
4 Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.). cert. denied. 431 U.S. 917 119-M).
615 F.2d at 1034.
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covered by the Act, so the question is not whether a rule against
black women amounts to discrimination against a group known to be
protected by the Act. To ask a parallel sex-plus question would be to
inquire if a rule against blackness applied only to women amounts to
discrimination against women. The strangeness in the phrasing of this
question reveals the contortion of the analogy.
The confusion caused by the analogy arises from the popular
term for this line of cases: "sex-plus." The term is misleading, howev-
er, because a rule that excludes married females does not involve
discrimination based on something in addition to sex; the rule singles
out a subset of married persons and operates exclusively against
women. The category of affected persons is the protected class of
women and a single-dimension claim of disparate treatment of women
is established. Unless the employer can demonstrate that the rule
reflects a BFOQ, 45 the practice unlawfully discriminates against
women. The court would not logically try to probe the existence of
only sex discrimination when presented with a rule excluding black
women. If the sex-plus analogy were used, the court would ask if the
employer's rule singled out only women among black persons. The
answer might be yes, but then only a sex discrimination claim has
been established.
Discrimination against the compound group of black women is
simply not analogous to single-dimension sex discrimination. Typical
sex-plus discrimination, such as a no-marriage requirement, affects
women who are not part of the sex-plus category; these women are
exposed to the threat of dismissal if they change their status. A rule
against blackness applied only to women, by contrast, could not even
potentially affect all women. Furthermore, a BFOQ defense is avail-
able against claims of sex discrimination. For race discrimination,
however, there is no BFOQ defense.4" If compound discrimination
against black women were treated as sex discrimination, the courts
would be in the anomalous position of determining whether a BFOQ
defense should be allowed for exclusion based on race for black
On the bona fide occupational qualification defense, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 331-36 (1977); In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142.
1146-47 (7th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v, Zipos, 47
U.S.L.W. 3779 (U.S. Apr. 11, 1979) (No. 78-1549); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 39-40 (5th Cir.
1974); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 40-1 U.S.
950 (1971).
4 The BFOQ defense is provided in the Act as a defense to sex discrimination suits, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
Title VII, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 255 (1964)). No similar defense is provided for race discrimination
claims.
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women only. In a sex-plus case, the BFOQ for excluding married
women would depend on an occupational necessity for a rule pro-
hibiting marriage for women employees. The comparable BFOQ for
excluding black women would have to depend on a necessity for ex-
cluding blackness for women employees-a defense not permitted by
the Act. 47
This discussion demonstrates two points. First, compound dis-
crimination is a problem distinct from sex discrimination and does not
lend itself to sex-plus analysis. If the "plus" is race, the Act precludes
any BFOQ defense and a sex-plus inquiry adds nothing. Although the
Fifth Circuit was persuaded by the analogy,-S it does not resolve the
question whether compound discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.
Instead, a practice that overtly excludes a compound group, such as
an employment rule explicitly prohibiting the hiring of black women,
should be treated simply as intentional discrimination of the type that
Congress intended to cover. 9 Furthermore, if the Act's protection
extends to compound groups, then practices which disproportionately
affect such groups, as well as overtly discriminatory practices, should
be examined. Disparate impact analysis is needed to determine the
discriminatory effect of a practice.
II
DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION
Even if intentional discrimination against compound groups is
prohibited under Title VII, the question remains whether neutral
4 Although the Act does not specifically permit the BFOQ defense for discrimination based
on marital status, see id., in a sex-plus case the availability of a BFOQ defense is predicated on
the essential identity of sex-plus and sex discrimination. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974). In theory. sex-pius analysis of a
compound discrimination claim could result in incorporating race in the BFOQ defense to sex
discrimination. The EEOC, however, clearly refuses to permit the BFOQ defense for any claim
involving racial distinctions: "All discrimination by race or color is forbidden, as is any limita-
tion, classification, or segregation that affects any person adversely; in practice this means al-
ways. Race or color can never be a bona fide occupational qualification or a reason for differen-
tial treatment of any kind." 1 EEO Compl. Man. (P-H) 1201 (emphasis in original). see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
The analysis might more successfully be reversed by using a "race-plus- approach, but
race-plus rules have not emerged in the case law. A hypothetical race-plus situation would
involve an employer who has a rule prohibiting the hiring of blacs who have a history of drug
abuse, but no similar rule excluding whites with a history of drug abuse. The employer might
claim that it is a rule against drug abusers, not blacks. A court using the sex-plus analogy would
find that this is a race-plus rule that amounts to race discrimination. No such employment rules
have been the subject of Title VII litigation.
41 See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025. 1033-34 i5th Cir.
1980).
4 See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
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employment practices that have a disproportionate impact on com-
pound groups are prohibited unless business necessity can be shown.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.50 and subsequent Supreme Court
decisions 5 established the use of disparate impact analysis to demon-
strate discrimination against single-dimension classes. No court at any
level, however, has squarely addressed whether these principles
properly can be applied to compound groups.-32
Suppose, for example, that an employer in a community with a
substantial percentage of Hispanic workers hires large numbers of
Hispanic women, but few Hispanic men. Assume further that this
results from an informal hiring process and that no intentional exclu-
sion of Hispanic men can be demonstrated. Unless the class of
Hispanic men is permitted to show the disparate impact of the em-
ployer's practices on their group, they would be unable to obtain
relief. Although the Act might prohibit intentional discrimination
against compound groups, it is assumed here that no disparate treat-
ment can be shown. If the evidence demonstrates no adverse impact
on Hispanics as a group (men plus women) and no adverse impact on
men as a group (all ethnic groups), then the question is whether the
employer is insulated from the necessity of showing the job-
relatedness of hiring practices that disproportionately exclude His-
panic men."
Disparate impact analysis should be available to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination against a compound group., Safeguards
- 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
5' Dothard v. Rawlinson, 4,33 U.S. 321, 328-31, 334-37 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 334-37 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422, 425 (1975),
52 In several cases plaintiffs have imposed a compound restriction on either the certified
class or on the proof of disparate impact. These cases do not discuss the restriction of the class
or proof to a compound group, but they involve race or national origin discrimination In jobs
that are sex-stereotyped. The total exclusion of one sex from any consideration in hiring results
in a compound plaintiff group, such as Hispanic males, challenging rates of hiring for white
males. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (census figures on high
school diplomas used to compare white males with black males); Marks v. Prattco, 607 F.2d
1153 (5th Cir. 1979) (comparison limited to black and white female housekeepers at motel);
EEOC v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1977) (statistical
proof assumed limitation to males in racial and ethnic comparisons); Gay v. Walters' Union,
Local 30, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 280, 280 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (class certified as all black males
working or desiring to work as waiters).
m Whether compound groups are separately protected is unresolved under Title VIl, but
has been addressed in part in the Department of Labor Regulations on Equal Employment
Opportunity in Apprenticeship and Training, 29 C.F.R. § 30.4(0 (1980). See note 4 supra.
I In reverse discrimination actions, for example, the question is whether white males
should have a Title VII claim when disparate impact against them can be shown even though
there is no overt affirmative action plan, and, therefore, intentional exclusion cannot be proven.
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should be incorporated into the statistical methods of proof, however,
in order to avoid the possibility that an employer's work force could
be so over-analyzed that a prima facie case could be established by
mere chance during the process of repeated analysis." As an addi-
tional safeguard, the standing of compound groups should be re-
stricted to two dimensions only, not permitted three or more di-
mensions to create a separately protected group. The proliferation of
categories permitting, for example, young black Catholic women to
be treated as separately protected, leads too easily to spurious
cases.- With these restrictions to protect potential defendants from
meritless claims, it is appropriate to use disparate impact analysis for
compound groups as for any single class protected by Title VrI.
A. The Function of Adverse Impact Analysis
for Compound Discrimination
If courts accept the proposition that Title VII protects individuals
from intentional discrimination suffered because of membership in a
compound group, then compound groups should be afforded the
same legal protection as any other group now protected by Title NI.
Thus, not only should disparate treatment be prohibited, but unjusti-
fied practices that have an adverse impact on compound groups
should be prohibited as well.Y The same considerations that support
Such a case, for instance, might emerge from the employment practices in what %%-s the Higher
Education Division of HEW (now HHS), in which women and blacks are heaily represented
among staff members:
Women and especially blacks are overrepresented among the 74 staff members in the
Higher Education Division. On June 30, 1973, about one-half (35) were women, almost
three-fifths (43) were members of minorities, and approximately one-lalf (3.5) were blacks.
The 58 regional compliance officers were distributed as follows: 25 women (13 blacks. 10
whites, and 2 members of other minorities) and 33 males (13 blacks. 14 whites, and 6
members of other minorities).
R. Lester, Anutibias Regulation of Universities: Faculty Problems and Their Solutions 105 (1974).
An imbalance disfavoring white males among professionals in the EEOC is the subject of an
ongoing class action suit. This imbalance is alleged to be the result of implementing affirmative
action plans, Jurgens v. Norton, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 173S (N.D. Tex. 19SO). However, if
the alleged exclusion cannot be shown to be intentional and unlawful, should plaintiffs establish
a prima facie case with statistics showing a significant exclusion? This Article argues that dispa-
rate impact analysis should be available for any compound group. including white males in
reverse discrimination suits.
" See note 106 infra.
- See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
57The coverage of compound groups should include not only those situations in which sex-
stereotyped jobs in race discrimination cases create compound classes, see note 52 supra. but
also situations in which a class is compound because that group is disadvantaged by employment
practices more than others of all races and sexes. See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
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the application of adverse impact analysis to Title VII claims for sepa-
rate race or sex discrimination compel the application of the doctrine
to compound discrimination claims.
The principle underlying adverse impact analysis is that an em-
ployer should be required to demonstrate a business necessity for any
requirement that has the effect of disproportionately excluding a
group protected by Title VII. When the Supreme Court adopted this
operational definition of discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
it relied on Congress' intent to remove the "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate in-
vidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification." ' 8 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous
Court, also noted that Title VII proscribes discriminatory preferences
for any group, minority or majority. 9 Striking down Duke Power
Company's high school diploma requirement and testing practices,
the Court rejected the proposition that intent to discriminate must be
shown: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability." '
That rationale is equally applicable to discrimination directed to-
ward a compound group. A compound group such as black women
should be considered an "impermissible classification" because dis-
crimination against them results in discriminatory preferences for
other groups. That the minority groups of black men and white
women might benefit from discrimination against black women is
irrelevant. Thus, a black female plaintiff's proof of the exclusionary
impact of hiring practices on her compound group should, as in
Griggs, shift the burden to the defendant to show the business justi-
fication for the practices. 61 She should not be required to demon-
strate the employer's intent to discriminate against her particular group.
B. Manner of Proof
If disparate impact analysis is applied to cases of compound dis-
crimination, plaintiffs will be introducing increasing volumes of
401 U.S. at 431.
Id.
ro Id. at 432.
6, See id. If the employer meets its burden of demonstrating a business justification for the
practice, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that the business objective could have been
accomplished by other, nondiscriminatory employment practices. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
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numerical data into evidence. The potential for abuse is great; when
an employer's work force is cross-classified and subdivided countless
numbers of times, the possibility of obtaining a misleading statistical
result greatly increases. 6- However, guidelines for using statistics to
prove compound discrimination can be formulated to minimize the
possibility of misuse while allowing courts to probe disparate impact.
The question is how to assess the substantiality of underrepre-
sentation of a compound group in the employer's work force. The
Affirmative Action Guidelines of the Office of Federal Contracts
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) recognize this issue without provid-
ing specific guidance on resolving it. The Guidelines provide that if
the compliance agency discovers a "substantial disparity" in the utili-
zation of men or women of a particular minority group, the agency
may require the employer to establish separate goals and timetables
for those groups.6 The Guidelines, however, do not establish the
method for assessing the substantiality of the disparity.
Assume, for example, that an employer draws its work force from
a community of the following composition: 40% white men, 40%
white women, 10% black men, and 10% black women. The employer
has 100 employees with the following breakdown: 38 white men, 42
white women, 12 black men, and 8 black women. There is no race
discrimination here because whites are represented 80% and blacks
are represented 20%, exactly as in the population. Similarly, there is
no sex discrimination here because women and men constitute 50%
of both the work force and the population. There is overrepresenta-
tion of white women and black men in this situation, however, and a
corresponding underrepresentation of black women and white men.
It remains to be demonstrated whether this evidence is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination against either of the
underrepresented compound groups. Examining these figures by a
simple inspection of the raw numbers, one might conclude intuitively
that the disparity in representation of these groups in the work force
compared to the population is very slight. Intuition may serve well in
a case such as this one, but it is an inexact approach to the
question.' The use of intuition to assess the substantiality of differ-
U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405. 425 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
'2 See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(1) (1980).
For a discussion of the pitfalls of relying on intuition instead of more precise statistical
analysis, see M. Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law 1-17 (1978). Shoben. Book Review,
59 B.U.L. Rev. 582, 585-96 (1979) (Quantitative Methods in Law. M. Finkelstein).
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ences becomes very difficult in close cases and leads to a lack of uni-
formity in results across cases.
Alternatively, the question of the substantiality of differences in
representation can be addressed in terms of probability: how likely is
it that chance alone would produce a work force of this particular
composition for a nondiscriminating employer? As a statistical analo-
gy, imagine an infinitely large drum filled with an infinite number of
marbles which are 40% blue, 40% yellow, 10% red, and 10% green.
Someone sits and blindly draws 100 marbles, sorts them into type
and counts each group. The particular composition of this draw is
recorded on paper and then the marbles are thrown back into the
drum. The drum is rotated to mix up the marbles again and another
draw is made. This process continues indefinitely. This monotonous
marble-drawing will result occasionally in some very unusual pat-
terns: all of one color will be drawn some time, and there will be
other odd results. Most of the time, however, the patterns of the
draw will more or less resemble the composition of all of the marbles
in the drum.
Now, a second person comes along and draws just once a hun-
dred marbles from the barrel. It is not known if he drew them
blindly.r In order to probe the likelihood that the second person's
draw was blind,6 an examiner can compare the composition of the
second person's draw to the number of times that result, or one more
unusual, has been found by blindly drawing infinite numbers of times
from the drum. If the second person's result is a fairly common one,
then it was probable to appear by chance in this single draw. On the
other hand, if the result was a very rare one, 7 it would be highly
improbable that such a result would be obtained by chance when
drawing once. Appropriate statistical calculation provides this prob-
6 This process is analogous to the employment situation in which an employer hires in one
year a specific composition of employees from a pool of available employees of a specific com-
position. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977).
6 The term "blind" is used here to mean in a manner that does not disfavor any color.
Although the choice of the level of rareness is a matter of policy, one chance out of 20
(the 5% or .05 level) is the most common choice for the degree of rareness considered too rare
to have happened by chance alone in experimental situations. Hallock, The Numbers Game-
The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 Viil. L. Rev. 5, 13-14 (1977)
[hereinafter The Numbers Game]. The level chosen is called the level of significance. F. Mos-
teller, R. Rourke & G. Thomas, Probability with Statistical Applications 305-07, 311 (2d ed.
1970). If a result is likely to happen by chance alone less than one time in 20, It Is called
significant at the .05 level. Id. at 306. On levels of significance in civil rights litigation, see
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n. 17 (1977); D. Baldus & J. Cole, Statistical Proof of
Discrimination 308 (1980); The Numbers Game, supra, at 11-15.
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ability to assist the examiner in deciding if the draw was too rare to
be considered a blind draw.
The Supreme Court has approved the use of statistical probabil-
ity analysis to probe race discrimination in Title VII disparate impact
situations.' Statistical analysis has also been employed by courts in
disparate impact sex discrimination cases. 69 As noted by the
Supreme Court, the appropriate statistical tool to compare the racial
composition of the population to the racial composition of the work
force is the binomial test.' The binomial test can also be used, of
course, to make a similar inquiry concerning sex discrimination.
As its name suggests, however, the binomial test can be used
only for situations involving two terms, such as black and white.
Compound discrimination requires a slightly different analysis to
handle several terms-such as white men, white women, black men,
and black women-in one analysis. A statistical test related to the
binomial test, the chi-square test, can be used for this situation.'
C. Chi-Square Calculation
The chi-square test is a general test suitable for evaluating the
difference between observed and expected frequencies from inde-
pendent random samples of nominally classified data.' In the simplest
case, there are only two categories into which all observations are
classified, such as males and females, and the chi-square test is the
functional equivalent of the binomial test referred to previously."
Either test may be used to analyze the two-category case. Use of the
chi-square test as an alternative to the binomial test will be addressed
in the next section. 74 Use of the chi-square test for several-group
analysis is discussed first because it is directly relevant to problems of
analyzing compound discrimination.
" See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States. 433 U.S. 299. 308 n.14 (197).
" See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S., 321. 329-31 (1977- Greenspan v. Automobile
Club, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-33 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
, See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 308 n.14 (1977); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977). On the nature of the binomial test. see H. Bock.
Social Statistics 149-74 (rev. 2d ed. 1979); L. Horowitz, Elements of Statistics for Psychology
and Education 128-51 (1974); F. Mosteller, R. Rourke & C. Thomas. supra note 67. at 130-37.
See also Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination
Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 349-73 (1966).
71 On the use of chi-square generally in employment discrimination litigation. se The Num-
bers Game, supra note 67, at 28-30.
2 See H. Blalock, supra note 70, at 279-82; L. Horowitz. supra note 70. at 365-66.
,3 See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. More exactly, the chi-square is the functional
equivalent of the normal curve approximation of the binomial. See L Horowitz. supra note 70.
at 143-49, 371-75.
" See text accompanying notes 88-95 infra.
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The chi-square test may be used to examine whether two vari-
ables interact. For example, a group of people may be classified by
height (tall or short) and by weight (heavy or light), and an examiner
may wish to evaluate whether height and weight interact in such a
manner that a particular height characteristic may be associated with
a particular weight classification. If height and weight are uncorre-
lated, then one would expect to find heavy people proportionately
represented among both tall and short people. If height and weight
interact, however, one may find a disproportionate number of heavy
people among tall people, for example. 7  This same kind of analysis
can be applied to examine whether race and sex interact to result in a
disproportionate underrepresentation of one group, such as black
women. In this way, one can determine whether the proportional
representation of such a group is even less than one might expect
based on the cumulative effects of race and sex discrimination.
Chi-square analysis begins by checking that the assumptions
underlying the test 76 have been met: the variables must be classified
into discrete categories, and the data must come from independent
random samples.7 An analysis of the interaction of two discrete vari-
ables, such as race and sex, may then begin by establishing a 2 x 2
contingency table, such as the one shown in Figure 1.
Whites
Blacks
Men Women
a b
C d
a+b
c+d
a+c b+d a+b+c+d
Total
Figure 1. Contingency table for 2 x 2 design: race (white and
black) and sex (men and women).
Each side of this table represents the two levels of each category, and
the marginal totals show the sum of the number of individuals in each
category, in this instance, whites, blacks, men, and women. Numbers
in the four squares inside the table represent the number of indi-
viduals in each compound group, starting with white males in the
upper left hand corner. The total shown at the lower right must equal
the sum of the numbers in the four squares, which will also be the
See H. Blalock, supra note 70, at 279-80.
76 See id. at 282.
,7 On problems of random sampling in employment discrimination cases, see D. Baldus & J.
Cole, supra note 67, at 314-15.
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sum of the vertical marginal totals, as well as the sum of the horizon-
tal marginal totals.
The contingency table shown in Figure 2 represents the racial
and sexual composition of a hypothetical employer's work force.
Men Women
94 76 170(85) (85)
6 24Blacks 62(15) (15) 30
100 100 200
Figure 2. Contingency table showing distribution by race and sex
of employees in hypothetical company. Numbers in parentheses
are the "expected values" of each compound group based upon
expected proportional representation (given the marginal totals).
There are 170 whites, 30 blacks, 100 men, and 100 women. The
numbers in the squares represent the breakdown into the compound
groups: 94 white men, 6 black men, 76 white women, and 24 black
women. These numbers, the actual count of workers in each cate-
gory, are called the "observed frequencies" in the four cells. The
numbers in parentheses below the observed frequencies are the "ex-
pected frequencies" which one would expect to appear in these cells
if there is no adverse interaction of race and sex. The next question is
whether the expected values differ significantly from the observed
ones. The data from the hypothetical employer in this problem in-
tuitively suggests that black men may be underrepresented in the
work force, but analysis can show whether this underrepresentation
would be highly unlikely to occur by chance alone.- If so, the em-
ployer should justify the selection process that disproportionately ex-
cludes black men.- This probability is calculated as follows:
(1) First, expected frequencies, such as those shown in parenthe-
ses in Figure 2, must be ascertained. They represent the expected
values if the proportional representation of the four subgroups simply
reflected the proportions of the two major groups. In this case, since
the men and women are equally divided in this group of 200 persons,
proportionate representation would mean that both the black and
white groups are composed half of men and half of women. There are
170 whites, so the expected values for men and women are 85 in
-1It is normal for there to be a certain degree of fluctuation from the expected v-lues. See
text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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each cell; similarly, there are 30 blacks so the expected values for
men and women are each 15. The formula for ascertaining expected
values for each cell is to multiply the marginal totals corresponding to
that cell and then to divide by the total number in all cells.') Here,
for cell a (white men) the marginal total for whites (170) is multiplied
by the marginal total for men (100) and divided by the total (200) to
reach 85. The expected value of the cell of black men is (30 X 100)/
200 = 15. The same approach is used for all four cells.
(2) For each cell the following calculation is taken: subtract the
expected frequency from the observed frequency, square this differ-
ence, and then divide this result by the expected frequency. This
calculation is repeated for all four cells, and then the four resulting
numbers are added. This number is called the chi-square statistic.'
For the hypothetical case shown in Figure 2, the calculation
would be as follows:
for white men: (94 - 85)2/85 = 81/85 = 0.95;
for white women: (76 - 85)2/85 = 81/85 = 0.95;
for black men: (6 - 15)2/15 = 81/15 = 5.40;
for black women: (24 - 15)2/15 = 81/15 = 5.40.
These four numbers for the four cells are now summed: 0.95 + 0.95
+ 5.40 + 5.40 = 12.70. Thus, the chi-square statistic for this prob-
lem is 12.70.
(3) The probability of obtaining a particular result can be evalu-
ated by comparing the chi-square statistic obtained from the previous
calculation to a table of "critical" values of the chi-square
distribution.z The portion of that table appropriate for evaluating an
interaction of two variables (such as race and sex) can be summarized
here: there is a less than .05 probability (one in twenty) of obtaining
an observed result by chance alone when the chi-square statistic is
3.84 or larger."' In other words, 3.84 is the critical value for the 5%
level of probability. Any chi-square statistic from a 2 x 2 contingency
table that is greater than 3.84 is statistically "significant" at the 5%
level. In the hypothetical case used here, the chi-square statistic was
found to be 12.70, well above the critical value at the 5% level.
10 See H. Blalock, supra note 70, at 283-85.
8 1 Id. at 281-84.
12Id. at 288-89. Chi-square tables can be found in any standard statistics text. See, e.g., id.
at 613; L. Horowitz, supra note 70, at 440-41.
13On levels of significance, see note 67 supra. This conclusion is based on the use of a
two-tailed test, meaning that it is assumed that the outcome of the test could favor or disfavor
any group. For a discussion of one- and two-tailed tests, see D. Baldus & J. Cole, supra note
67, at 307-08.
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Therefore, the difference between the observed and expected values
in the compound group can be considered substantial, and there
appears to be an adverse effect resulting from the interaction be-
tween race and sex in this work force. A class of black males should
have a prima facie case with these statistics, and the burden should
shift to the defendant to show a business necessity for the selection
procedure resulting in this work force composition.
D. Sequence of Analyses for Race and
Sex Factors
The chi-square test described in the preceding section analyzes
only whether the interaction of two variables, such as race and sex,
affected the disproportionate representation of a compound group
within the employer's work force. It does not consider whether race
discrimination, sex discrimination, or both influenced the initial
formation of the overall work force. A plaintiff would typically be un-
certain at the outset of a lawsuit whether he or she had been a victim
of race discrimination, sex discrimination, both race and sex discrim-
ination (double discrimination), or compound discrimination (the in-
teraction of race and sex discrimination). An orderly progression of
data analysis, therefore, is proposed here.
1. Single-Dimension Claims.
Single-dimension claims of race discrimination or sex discrimina-
tion may be analyzed by comparing the racial or sexual composition
of the employer's work force with the composition of the relevant
4 On the nature of the defendant's burden under Title VII to show business necessity once
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, see cases cited in note 51 supra.
A prima fie case may be established by statistical proof, International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977), but the courts will consider whether all the facts
and circumstances support the statistical findings. E.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S.
324, 340 (1977). Furthermore, a statistically significant result may not rise to the level of legal
significance in all cases. The Supreme Court has generally approved statistical significance as a
measure of significant discrimination, e.g., Hazelwood Sciool Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
at 311 n.17 (standard deviation analysis may be used for both establishing and rebutting prima
facie case); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (recognizing significance at
"greater than two or three standard deviations"), and the Federal Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.14 (B)(5) (19S0). adopt the 5% level of probabil-
ity as the measure of significance for proof of discrimination. See note 67 supra. However.
statistical and legal significance may differ. See United States v. Test. 550 F.2d 577, 5S4 (10th
Cir. 1976); The Numbers Came, supra note 67, at 12-18.
1 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
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population in the surrounding community.' As the Court indicated
in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 7 a statistical test
called the binomial test may be used to compare the substantiality of
the differences found between those two compositions." Alterna-
tively, a chi-square test may be used because the chi-square test involv-
ing only two cells is functionally identical to the binomial test.8 9
Furthermore, many people find the chi-square test conceptually
easier.
The calculation of a two-celled chi-square test proceeds as
follows29 First, two cells are designated to represent the two (and
only two) categories involved, such as whites and blacks. The actual
numbers of whites and blacks in the employer's work force are the
"observed values." The "expected values" are the number of whites
and blacks that would be expected in a work force of the employer's
particular size, based on the proportionate representation of these
two groups in the relevant population. The expected number of
whites in the employer's work force is calculated by multiplying the
percentage of whites in the relevant population by the total number
of employees. Similarly, the percentage of blacks in the relevant
population is multiplied by the total number of employees. For exam-
ple, if a hypothetical employer had 1,000 employees (950 whites and
50 blacks) drawn from a community with a relevant population that is
90% white and 10% black, the observed values of whites and blacks
would be 950 and 50 respectively, whereas the expected values
would be 900 and 100. These values are displayed in Figure 3.
Whites Blacks
950 50 1000
(900) (100) total
Figure 3. Two-celled table showing distribution by race only in a
hypothetical company's work force. Numbers in parentheses are
the "expected values" in each category (based upon representation
in the relevant population).
6 Determining the relevant population for purposes of comparison is often a difficult Issue
in employment discrimination litigation. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977); S. Agid, Fair Employment Litigation 545-51 (2d ed. 1979).
- 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
s Id. at 308-09 n.14, 311 n.17. Although the Court refers to the statistical test as a "stan-
dard deviation analysis," the test is commonly called the binomial test or a test using the
binomial distribution. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 483, 496 n.17 (1977); M. Finkelsteln,
supra note 64, at 32-43; L. Horowitz, supra note 70, at 366-70; notes 69-70 supra.
See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
9 See M. Finkelstein, supra note 64, at 43-78; L. Horowitz, supra note 70, at 366-70.
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The actual calculation of the chi-square statistic is now the same
as described previously,9' except that only two cells are involved and
one small modification is made for statistical accuracy in the computa-
tion. As before, the expected value in each cell is subtracted from the
observed value in that cell. Now, however, '/, is subtracted from the
absolute value of this result before it is squared and divided by the
expected value. 2
Thus, the formula is:
Actual Expected _ 1 2 [(IActual - Expected 1 2
(I whites- whites + 11 blacks blacks D- I
Expected whites Expected blacks
If the result obtained from this calculation is greater than 3.84, it
would be statistically significant at the .05 level.3 In other words,
the disparity between the observed and expected numbers of blacks
and whites in the employer's work force may be considered signifi-
cant if the chi-square result is greater than 3.84. In the hypothetical
situation shown in Figure 3, the chi-square statistic would be 27.2.1
Since this value exceeds the number required for the .05 level of
significance, this statistical evidence should be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII.
2. Double Discrimination Analysis
Having found prima facie evidence of racial discrimination, a
plaintiff who was a black woman might analyze the data to determine
whether sex discrimination is present as well. Assume that in this
hypothetical employer's work force there are 530 men (of all races)
and 470 women. Assume further that men and women are equally
" See text accompanying note 81 supra.
12The subtraction of is a correction for continuity, necessary to make the calculation more
precise in the two cell situation. See H. Blalock, supra note 70, at 290-92; L. Horowitz. supra
note 70, at 368.
13On levels of significance, see note 67 supra. The critical value 3.84 is based on a two-
tailed test with one degree of freedom. See note 83 supra. Degrees of freedom are established
by determining the minimum number of cells whose value must be knohw in order to calculate
the values of all the other cells. Degrees of freedom must be determined before the critical
value can be ascertained. The 1x2 or 2X2 chi square almays has one degree of freedom. See
H. Blalock, supra note 70, at 288-90; T. Vonnacott & i Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics 517
(3d ed. 1977).
w The actual calculation is as follows:
[(1950 - 900)- Y22 [(1150 - 1001)- V 1 = 49.57 49.5 2
900 + 100 900 100
" See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1980]
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 817 1980
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
represented in the relevant population. The chi-square analysis would
proceed as described above for single-dimensional sex
discrimination.6 The figures for men and women would yield a chi-
square statistic of approximately 3.5.1 This result is less than the
critical value of 3.84 that is necessary for significance at the .05
level." Therefore, these data do not support a prima facie finding of
sex discrimination." In this hypothetical situation, there is, then, no
evidence of double discrimination (sex discrimination as well as race
discrimination).
3. Compound Discrimination Analysis
The hypothetical black woman plaintiff may now wish to investi-
gate the possible presence of compound discrimination. In other
words, she may wish to determine whether there is significant dis-
crimination against black women, apart from the discrimination
against blacks as a whole. Assume that in this employer's work force,
the 50 black workers are 40 men and 10 women and that of the 950
white workers, 490 are men and 460 are women. The four-celled chi-
square analysis is represented in Figure 4.
Men Women
Whites 490 460 950(503.5) (446.5)
Blacks 40 10 50(26.5) (23.5)
530 470 1000
Figure 4. Contingency table showing distribution by race and sex
of hypothetical employer's work force. Numbers in parentheses
represent "expected values" in each category.
See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
The actual calculation is as follows:
[(1530 - 5001) - V]+ [(1470 - 5001) - V2]2 29.52 29.5=500 + + 3481
On levels of significance, see note 67 supra. The critical value 3.84 is based on a two-
tailed test with one degree of freedom. See notes 83 & 93 supra.
I See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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The chi-square calculation produces a figure of 15.4,110 significant at
the .05 level. ' Thus, these data could be prima facie evidence of
compound discrimination against black women.
The statistical evidence with respect to this hypothetical em-
ployer has revealed an adverse impact of the employment practices
against both blacks and black women. In other words, blacks are dis-
advantaged as a whole, and black women even more so than black
men.102 The individual components of the employment process
should be scrutinized for the sources of these impacts. In the exam-
ple of the police department at the beginning of the Article,'" for
instance, blacks as a whole were disadvantaged by the written test
and black women were disadvantaged by the oral interview. In the
absence of proof of a business necessity for these practices, both
should be enjoined. If compound discrimination were not recognized
as separate from race discrimination, however, only the written test
would be enjoined. Similarly, if the court grants affirmative relief
such as quotas, it should take account of the especially disadvantaged
position of black women.1u
110 The actual calculation is as follows:
For white men- (490 - 503.5 = 0.36503.5
For white women: (460 - 446.5Y - 0.41
446.5
For black men: (40 - 26.5)2 6.88
26.5
For black women: (10 - 23.5Y 7.76
23.5
Total: 15.41
The chi-square statistic is thus 15.41. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
"'1 See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
1m Unlike the single-dimension test, see text accompanying notes 90-91 supra. the marginal
totals for each cell, rather than the proportional representation in the population, are used in
calculating the expected values. If the proportional representation were used, a significant chi-
square statistic would be ambiguous in this instance: it might reflect compound discrimination
or it might reflect one-dimensional or double discrimination. Using the marginal totals insures
that a significant chi-square statistic unambiguously indicates compound discrimination. Thus.
the expected value for any cell can be calculated by multiplying the marginal totals for that cell
and then dividing the result by the total number of employees. See text accompanying notes
79-81 supra. For example, the expected number of black women is calculated by mulUplying
the number of blacks (50) by the number of women (470) and dividing tie result by the total
number of employees (1000). The expected number of black women equals 23.5.
" See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
104 On the availability of types of affirmative relief in employment discrimination cases. see
generally A. Smith, Employment Discrimination Law 1116-78 11978); B. Schei & P. Crossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 1197-225 (1976); id. Supp.. at 331-33 (1979). S. Agid, Fair
Employment Litigation 810-77 (2d ed. 1979).
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This orderly progression of proof does not suggest that a plaintiff
must show discrimination along any single dimension (race or sex)
prior to proving compound discrimination. To the contrary, if com-
pound discrimination is separately protected under Title VII, proof of
compound discrimination alone, by showing an interaction between
race and sex, should be deemed to establish a prima facie case under
the Act. If both double and compound discrimination are alleged,
however, this progression of proof would provide the court with a
clear indication of the dimensions along which the plaintiff has proven
a prima facie case of disparate impact."
E. Avoidance of Indefinite Permutations
The most serious policy argument against recognizing compound
discrimination under Title VII is that plaintiffs could manipulate cate-
gories until one appears to show wrongful exclusion. Statistically,
every opportunity to show a significant result increases the probabil-
ity that some statistically significant disparity can be shown, even if,
in fact, the demonstration of discriminatory impact results from sam-
pling variation." Such statistical manipulation could lead to unjust
"Is This progression of proof for a double and compound discrimination case would solve the
difficulties encountered by one district court in 1975 when presented with a complaint alleging
sex discrimination as well as race and national origin discrimination. The court first found that
race and national origin discrimination claims could not be brought because the original charge
filed with the EEOC and the investigation had been for only sex discrimination. The court went
on to say:
Plaintiffs' complaint, by asserting both sex and racial discrimination, also raises the
problem of whether male members of the allegedly discriminated against races ought to
be included in the suit. There are three possible views of the case given that problem:
either the present alleged class is underinclusive, since no male minority race members
are included, or the class ought to be expanded to include male minority race members,
which undermines the sex discrimination identification, or the discriminatory classifica-
tions of sex and race have a synergistic effect, which to some degree impliedly dilutes the
singular claim of sex discrimination by non-minority race females. That dilemma posed by
the addition of race and national origin discrimination allegations highlights their lack of
relationship to sex discrimination. Thus, defendant's motion to strike the allegations of
racial and national origin discrimination is granted.
Jiron v. Sperry Rand Corp., 423 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D. Utah 1975).
106 The error of finding a significant result when in fact the result found occurred by chance
alone is called a Type I error (rejecting the true null hypothesis that there is no factor adversely
affecting the employment of a group protected by the Act). This type of error occurs when a
very rare sample happens to be found by chance alone. The likelihood of making a Type I error
increases if a sequence of statistical tests is performed on the data because each test contains i
probability of error and these probabilities aggregate as the number of tests increases. See H.
Blalock, supra note 70, at 109-12; L. Horowitz, supra note 61, at 167-68. The effect of" a Type I
error in an employment discrimination case is to find that a prima facie case has been made
when the evidence does not justify such a finding. See also D. Baldus & J. Cole, supra note 67,
at 291-92 n.5.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 55:793
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 820 1980
COMPOUND DISCRIMINATION
results. Employers could not withstand endlessly cumulative statisti-
cal scrutiny of their hiring methods, especially without establishing
illegal quotas to guarantee an artificially balanced work force. This
danger is limited under the proposed statistical test because plaintiffs
must show that discrimination results from the interaction of pro-
tected categories. They may not juxtapose categories such as black
women against a single other compound category, with a choice of
comparisons to black men, white women, or white men. Thus, the
proposed test limits plaintiffs to one opportunity to prove each dis-
tinct type of discrimination. To allow a single juxtaposition, such as
black women versus white men, would permit a plaintiff three sepa-
rate chances to establish disparate impact,'" with each chance in-
creasing the probability of finding impact when none exists.
Courts should further reduce the danger of statistical manipula-
tion by not allowing compounding of more than two protected cate-
gories. Groups such as black Catholic women or old Russian Jewish
men may be able to make the same arguments for recognition under
the Act that this Article has advanced for recognizing the combination
of two groups.' Nonetheless, the large number of permutations of
categories that could be generated by allowing more than two com-
bined categories creates unmanageable problems of proof. Absent a
method to handle these numerous permutations, courts should not
interpret the Act so broadly. Intentionally disparate treatment of such
groups should be considered prohibited by the ActY but the adverse
impact type of discrimination should not be included.
III
CLASS REPRESENTATION FOR COMPOUND AND
DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION CASES
If a plaintiff pleading double discrimination or double and com-
pound discrimination seeks class certification, the court must examine
whether the named plaintiff can represent all groups adequately.
Binding adjudication of the claims of all class members comports with
due process only if their representation is adequate."" Assume, for
107 The three chances would be: black women versus white women; black women versus
black men; and black women versus white men.
10 See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra. Data indicating high levels of unemployment for
groups such as young black males provide an additional reason that such groups should be
recognized. See Iden, The Labor Force Experience of Black Youth: A Review. 103 Monthly
Lab. Rev. 10, 10-15 (Aug. 1980).
"9 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
"o Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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example, that a black woman wishes to represent black and female
employees in a Title VII suit and the complaint alleges both double
and compound discrimination in pay by the employer. The evidence
shows that blacks are paid less than whites for the same work, women
are paid less than men, and black women are paid the least."' It is
immediately apparent that there exists a potential for conflict among
blacks, women, and black women. Although conflict may be a practi-
cal problem only at the relief stage of litigation, the potential for con-
flict may be apparent at the liability phase as well.
Reconsider the hypothetical case of a police department's hiring
practices presented at the beginning of this Article."' There were
three hiring requirements: a height requirement that adversely affects
women, a written test that disproportionately excludes blacks, and an
oral interview that has a significant disparate impact on black women
only. If both double and compound discrimination claims are pre-
sented, the court must consider possible antagonism between the
claims of blacks and women or between the claims of both of these
groups and those of the compound group of black women. In the
competition for a limited number of jobs, black men are better off not
challenging the height requirement because both black and white
men as a group gain an advantage from the requirement."3  Similar-
ly, white women are advantaged with white men from the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of blacks by the written test. Finally, both black
men and white women benefit from the oral interview because they
receive better ratings than black women. Courts must determine
whether such conflicts are sufficient to require the creation of sub-
classes with separate representatives.
"I An interesting example of this situation appears in a case which involved only a claim of
racial discrimination. The statistics in the opinion show that black women fared the worst in
hiring and promotion, worse than blacks overall and worse than women overall. Sledge v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1652, 1662-63, 1670-72 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd In part,
rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). Only race
discrimination was at issue in that case, but the evidence suggests that a sex discrimination
claim might have been brought by a proper class representative. Moreover, the evidence re-
veals that there is an interaction between race and sex such that the compound group of black
women appear to have fared worse than would be expected from the combined effects of race
discrimination and sex discrimination considered separately. Id. at 1662-63.
,n See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
"1 In County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 625
(1979), plaintiffs alleged discrimination against blacks and Mexican-Americans. Judge Wallace
noted that there is inherent antagonism between the class representatives and Mexican-
American class members in challenging a height requirement for hiring. Each named class
representative had fulfilled the 5'7" minimum height requirement and "applicants 5'7" or taller
have an interest in limiting the number of their competitors by retaining the height require-
ment." Id. at 1345 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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Courts already face a dilemma with respect to conflicts in double
discrimination class actions; recognition of compound groups will
increase these problems. In order to provide the fairness necessary
for finality,"5 a court must ensure that the multiple bases of relief for
the named plaintiff do not undermine the named plaintiff's ability to
represent adequately the interests of all class members.
Courts also must be mindful, however, that defendants gain a
strategic advantage over financially limited class representatives when
a court rules that subclasses must be formed and separate counsel
retained. An award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs "ll is not
always sufficient to ensure that plaintiffs can bear the financial bur-
dens of a court's creating several subclasses in a long and complicated
case. On the one hand, unnecessary subclassing should be avoided in
order to promote the broad purposes of the Act; on the other hand,
the fundamental requirements of class actions must be met in order
to achieve fairness and due process. Courts should strike this balance
by avoiding subclassing until the evidence reveals the presence of
actual conflict.11 7  Inherent conflict should not be assumed, and
potential conflict should not be a sufficient basis for imposing on
plaintiffs the difficulties of subclassing.
A. Rule 23 Problems with Double
Discrimination Cases
Several courts have recently considered problems of class repre-
sentation in cases in which the named plaintiff alleges double discrim-
ination, most typically pleading both sex and race discrimination. The
question is whether one representative, usually a black woman, can
represent both the class of women and the class of blacks. Rule 23(a)
"I Compare Vuyanich v. Republic Natl Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 435 (N.D. Tex. 1979) with
Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
X See text accompanying notes 119-67 infra.
16 Title VII grants courts discretion to award attorneys' fees to the premiling party. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 194. Pub. L. No. &S.352,
Title VII, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 253 (1954)). The Supreme Court has held that a similar provision
under Title II of the same Act should be interpreted to mean that prevailing plaintiffs should be
awarded attorneys" fees as a matter of course, absent reasons making such an award inequitable.
Prevailing plaintiffs need not show bad faith by the defendant. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). The Supreme Court has further held tat attorney's fees under
Title VII should not be awarded to prevailing defendants as a matter of course: "(A) plaintiff
should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim %-s
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly
became so." Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412. 422 (1978).
117 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), a court may issue a conditional class certification order and
amend it at any time prior to the decision on the merits.
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies four requirements
for certification of a class: numerosity, commonality of questions of
law or fact, typicality of the named plaintiffs' claims, and adequacy of
representation of class interests by the representatives." " The last
three of these prerequisites may present problems in double discrim-
ination suits.
1. Commonality
The commonality element requires that questions of law or fact
be common to the class."19 Courts generally have been liberal in
interpreting rule 23(a)(2) in Title VII actions. In Title VII class ac-
tions, complaints frequently allege "across the board" discriminatory
employment practices by defendant employers. 20  An across-the-
board action alleges discrimination in some combination of employ-
ment practices: hiring, work assignment, wages, transfer policies,
promotions, discharges, or other terms or conditions of employment.
The common questions are said to arise from an overall pattern of
discrimination in the employer's practices. In most cases,' the lack
of identity in the types of practices giving rise to individual claims is
not an obstacle. This same reasoning applies to meeting the com-
monality requirement in double discrimination across-the-board
cases. The common thread of pervasive discrimination in an em-
ployer's practices is generally sufficient to overcome differences be-
tween race and sex discrimination and differences in the particular
challenged employment practices." Even the creation of subclasses
reflecting those differences cannot destroy the commonality of the
claims. 12
1,8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). On the application of rule 23 to employment discrimination class
actions, see generally 4 H. Newberg on Class Actions §§ 7973-7993 (1977) (hereinafter
Newberg].
119 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
' See S. Agid, supra note 104, at 286-93; Newberg, supra note 118, § 7980, at 1290.
' See, e.g., Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98, 106 (E.D.
Pa. 1978). Frequently cited is the imagery borrowed by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc.: "the 'Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over
the racial class [and] is a question of fact common to all members of the class.'" 417 F.2d 1122,
1124 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn,
1966)). Under rule 23"s typicality and adequacy of representation requirements, however, the
lack of identity may bar certification of the class. See text accompanying notes 124-66 infra.
'2 See, e.g., Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 666-67 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (com-
monality requirement satisfied in case alleging both race and sex discrimination although white
woman's claim lacked typicality for claims of discrimination against blacks).
" See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 430-31 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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2. Typicality
A double discrimination case presents special problems in meet-
ing the typicality requirement. Rule 23(a)(3) 124 requires that the
claims of named plaintiffs be typical of those of the class members.
Although many courts have treated the typicality requirement as vir-
tually synonymous with either the commonality requirement 12, or the
adequacy of representation requirement,": others have attempted to
give it a particular meaning.27 The test is whether the named repre-
sentative's claim is sufficiently analogous to class members' claims.'-
One court listed three factors to be considered in Title VII cases: (1)
the similarity of the terms and conditions of employment, (2) the
similarity of the alleged discrimination, and (3) the compatibility of
the requested relief.'-
In double discrimination cases these factors sometimes point to-
ward a lack of typicality. In Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co.,'m for
example, a white woman wanted to be the class representative for
claims of both sex discrimination and race discrimination against
minorities. Although the court found the commonality requirement
satisfied, 3' the typicality requirement barred certification of the class.
The white woman's standing to complain of race discrimination
against minorities did not meet the typicality requirement because
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
' See, e.g., Green v. Volf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 2,99 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 39-3 U.S.
977 (1969); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970). See generally 3B J.
Moore Federal Practice 23.06-2, at 23-325 (2d ed. 1974).
' See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 19i). duPont v.
Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
W See, e.g., Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 829-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 434
U.S. 856 (1977); Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Ellison
v. Rock Hill Printing Co., 8 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 383. 384-85 (D.S.C. 1974).
m See Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1974); Black Grievance Comm. v. Phil-
adelphia Elec. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98, 107 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Other courts have read rule 23(a)(3) as requiring an analysis of the similarity of the factual
and legal situations of the representative and the rest oF the class. Wofford v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 489 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Karan v. Nabisco. Inc.. 78 F.RID. 3S3. 405 (W.D.
Pa. 1978); see 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1764, at 614 (1972).
Still other courts have read the test as requiring "the same degree of centrality." Parker v. Bell
Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 511 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Cottrell v. Virginia Ele. & Power Co.,
62 F.R.D. 516, 520 (E.D. Va. 1974). or some "nexus" between the claims of the representative
and those of the other class members, Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1974).
Hannigan v. Aydin Corp., 76 F.R.D. 502, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see Bartelson v. Dean Witter &
Co., 86 F.R.D. 657, 668 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
1 Lng v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1974); Hannigan v. Aydin Corp., 76 F.R.D.
502, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
m 86 F.R.D. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
131 Id. at 666-67.
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her claim of loss of association with minorities was not sufficiently
analogous to direct claims of race discrimination."' In another case,
in which double discrimination was alleged with a black female as
class representative, the court required subclasses to be formed to
satisfy the typicality requirement and to avoid class conflicts.,
The Supreme Court discussed rule 23(a)'s typicality requirement
in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez.?m In that
case, Mexican-American plaintiffs brought a class action against their
common-carrier employer and their unions. They alleged that job
transfer policies and the seniority system adversely affected blacks
and Mexican-Americans. The Court found that the named plaintiffs
did not " 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' ",- as
class members because they had not individually suffered any dis-
crimination. They had not suffered discrimination because they were
unqualified for the line-driver jobs they wished to transfer to, and
because they stipulated that they had not been discriminated against
in initial hiring,' leaving them unaffected by alleged discrimination
in a seniority system that keeps city-drivers and line-drivers
separate. ,1
Since Rodriguez, courts have split over how to apply this same
interest/same injury test. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Hill v.
Western Electric Co."' interpreted Rodriguez as greatly limiting
across-the-board actions. The Hill court ruled that a named repre-
sentative cannot represent "a class of people who suffered different
injury or those having similar claims but who are employed in other
facilities."",3 It applied that principle to mean that the action could
not encompass claims of discrimination against women and blacks in
hiring, nor against women in promotion in a particular department,
because no named plaintiff was a member of these excluded
32 Id. at 668-69. The Bartelson court attributed a "semantic integrity" to rule 23(a)(3) by
"focusing on its dictionary or common sense meaning." Id. The court equated this test with
tests developed by other courts and commentators. Id; see note 128 supra.
" Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 433-34 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
' 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
I- Id. at 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 203, 216
(1974)). Although the Rodriguez Court did not specifically tie the same interest/same injury test
to rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement, other courts have done so. See, e.g., Scott v. Universi-
ty of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Turner v. A.B. Carter,
Inc., 85 F.R.D. 360, 364 (E.D. Va. 1980).
36 431 U.S. at 403-04.
'm Id. at 405.
'3 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
' Id. at 102.
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classes.1' Similarly, the class could not include workers from facili-
ties other than the one at which the representatives were
employed."' It was permissible, however, to consider all persons
denied promotions in one facility as members of one class, even
though the promotion denials were in different departments. Chief
Judge Haynsworth explained: "Rodriguez did not require the frac-
tionization of similar claims by a class of employees in a single facil-
ity, nor does it destroy the utility of the class action device by requir-
ing separate suits on an episodic basis.""'
Another court has found Rodriguez much less restrictive. Dis-
trict Court Judge Higginbotham in Vuyanich v. Republic National
Bank 43 emphasized the importance of the distinction between the
named representative's suffering no injury at all, as in Rodriguez, and
the named representative's suffering an injury shared by some but
not all members of the class. In the Rodriguez situation the named
representative is not a member of the class at all,"' but in the other
types of cases the representative is a member of a class in which
other members have suffered similar but not identical injuries."4
140 Id. at 101; accord, Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers. Inc., 84 F.R.D. 640, 643
(E.D. Ark. 1979). Most circuits have not squarely faced the issue whether Rodriguez requires
that hiring and promotion claims of discrimination not be brought by the same class representa-
tive. A rejected applicant never has a promotion problem, so a single class representative can-
not be a member of both groups. Hill held that the Rodriguez same interest/same injury test
was not met under those circumstances; class representatives who suffered discrimination in
promotion or terms and conditions of employment do not have claims typical of those who were
denied any employment. 596 F.2d at 101-02.
In a case decided after Rodriguez, the Third Circuit held that a black professor denied
tenure could not represent a class of those not hired. The court found that the typicality re-
quirement was not satisfied because the named representative's interests diverged greatly from
the applicant class. Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76. 85-86 (3d Cir.). cert. denied. 444
U.S. 931 (1979). A concurring opinion by Judge Adams emphasized that the majority opinion
was not meant to be too restrictive. "We do not hold ... that in general a person allegedly
discriminated against with respect to promotion may not represent a class including individuals
who were aggrieved by the employers hiring practices." Id. at 93 (Adams. J.. concurring). See
also Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 450-81 (7th Cir. 19S0) (plintiffs claim
very personal; same interest/same injury test not met); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld. 614 F.2d 796,
809 (1st Cir. 1980) (one representative may represent both hiring and promotion class claims
when the challenged procedures are "closely akin,- but not allowed under special facts orcase).
Duncan v. Tennessee, 84 F.R.D. 21, 34 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (former employee may not repre-
sent class of applicants without a showing of applicants who have been subject to discrimina-
tion); RWDSU, Local 194 v. Standard Brands. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 409 (N.D. II. 1979).
"1 596 F.2d at 102. See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.. 628 F.2d 267 4th Cir.
1980) (not suffcient showing of common practices among facilities to allow statewide class).
14 596 F.2d at 102.
1 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
' See East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc., v. Rodriguez. 431 U.S. 395. 403-404 (1977).
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School Dist. No. 213. 565 F.2d 10S7. 194 n.10 (9th Cir. 19j7.
I' 82 F.R.D. at 433 n.8; e. Petty v. People Gas Light & Coke Co., 86 F.R.D. 336. 340
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (typicality requirement met whenever named plaintiff is adversely affected by
the same practice; injury need not be precisely the same).
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Understood in this way, Rodriguez does not limit the application of
rule 23 to absolutely identical harm resulting from exactly the same
type of practice. The typicality prerequisite for a class action may be
satisfied by much less.16
3. Conflict
The adequacy of representation requirement of rule 23(a)(4),
poses the greatest problem in double discrimination cases. Several
courts have held that a single class representative may not represent
both females and minorities even if the representative has allegedly
been a victim of both types of discrimination.'48 The difficulty with a
single class representative for a double discrimination case is the
potential for conflict. It is a fundamental requirement in class actions
that the interests of the class representative cannot be antagonistic to
the interests of members of the class.'4 9 If such antagonism exists,
the named plaintiffs cannot fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. For example, in Rodriguez, the named plaintiffs' request
for relief presented a conflict because they sought a merger of the
city-driver and line-driver collective bargaining units, whereas mem-
bers of the class had voted against exactly such a merger.'51
When a Title VII complaint alleges both race and sex discrim-
ination, some courts have held that a single representative is inade-
quate to protect the interests of both groups because there is "inher-
ent conflict" between the groups.'3' Representing both groups puts
the named plaintiff in an untenable position, one district court
explained,1z because the plaintiff would be arguing both that the de-
l" See 82 F.R.D. at 432-33. The Fifth Circuit does not find the nexus requirement in Rodri-
guez as restrictive. It held in Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980). that It Is
consistent with Rodriguez to allow a plaintiff to represent a class of Mexican-Americans on both
promotion and hiring claims. The common national origin discrimination complaint can "out-
weigh the fact that the members of the plaintiff class may be complaining about somewhat
different specific discriminatory practices." Id. at 375.
147 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
" Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 435-36 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Colston v.
Maryland Cup Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. 83, 85 (D. Md. 1978); Droughn v. FMC Corp.,
74 F.R.D. 639, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
"' East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-46 (1940); Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459,
463 (10th Cir. 1974); Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151 (8th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 776 (1944); Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52
F.R.D. 335, 340-41 (D. Minn. 1971).
' East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977).
5 See cases cited in note 148 supra.
1 2 Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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fendant's employment policies discriminate in favor of men, including
black men, and that the defendant's policies discriminate in favor of
whites, including white females. The court concluded: "A single liti-
gant should not be asked to juggle these conflicting interests in an
adversary system of justice." '
Other courts have not considered the conflict between race and
sex groups to be an inherent conflict in a Title VII case, but have
found the existence of actual conflict. In one case, for example, a
black woman was the named plaintiff for a class of both women and
blacks. In her deposition, however, she revealed that she believed
favorable treatment was given to white women over black women,
In another case the complaint alleged both race and sex discrimina-
tion, but it also alleged that there were racist attitudes on the part of
white women workers. Since those white women workers would be a
part of the class the black woman sought to represent, the court held
that she would be an inadequate representative for the double dis-
crimination claim." Revelation of any actual conflict always requires
either the formation of subclasses or the disqualification of class rep-
resentatives on some claims.'"
Vuyanich contains the most complete analysis of possible con-
flicts among subgroups in a double discrimination case.r" Judge
Higginbotham was unwilling to find as a matter of law that conflict
inherently exists in a double discrimination case, but required that a
careful inquiry be made to determine whether 'fundamental antago-
nism actually exists or is likely to result from dual representation.""t
He found a conflict between black and female applicants for some
positions with the bank and required the subclassing of those
groups." Since the hiring records showed that a sizeable number of
these positions were filled by white women,' black applicants might
m Id. at 643. See also Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia Elee. Co., 79 F.R.D. 98.
110-11 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (black class representative may not represent both blacks and Spanish-
surnamed individuals).
' Colston v. Maryland Cup Corp., 18 Fair Empl. Pric. Cas. 83. 85 (D. Md. 1978).
Vuyanich v. Republic Natl Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420. 435-36 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (5th Cir. 19S0) (inadequate repre-
sentation of Mexican-Americans in suit alleging discrimination against both blacks and Mexican-
Americans because class representative failed to produce evidence on latter group; trial court
should have decertified class or certified a subclass). On the formation or subasses under rule
23(c)(4), see Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure. 39 F.R.D. 69. 106 (1966).
See also Adv. Comm. note on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). On disqualification of the class repre-
sentative because of conflicts, see, e.g., Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie Creenville. Inc.. 62 F.R.D.
370, 375-76, 377 (D.S.C. 1974).
17Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 434-36 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
m Id. at 435.
s Id.
I10 Id. at 431 n.6.
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easily contend that white females were hired in place of blacks. Judge
Higginbotham found no conflict between female and black applicants
for a second category of positions with the bank, however, because
the available evidence indicated that white males held most of those
jobs.16" ' Neither black nor female applicants were likely to argue that
those jobs were filled by fellow members of the class, making sub-
classing unnecessary. 62 If evidence indicating a further conflict were
to emerge at trial, the court suggested that additional subclassing
might then be required.1 6
Judge Higginbotham's approach may strike the best balance be-
tween the dangers of dampening employment discrimination class ac-
tions and of failing to provide sufficient safeguards to protect the in-
terests of all class members."l Inherent conflict should not be found
in all double discrimination cases, but subclassing can be required if
and when actual conflict is discovered.
A refinement of this basic approach would be helpful. In
Vuyanich the court found conflict in the situation in which black ap-
plicants could claim that white women received jobs that blacks
might have received but for race discrimination. If both race and sex
discrimination were present as alleged, however, this conflict might
be more imagined than real. Proof of a Title VII claim does not focus
on who is favored, but rather on who is disfavored.' If the bank's
employment practices adversely affected both blacks and women,
then it should be irrelevant that on particular occasions exclusion of
one applicant resulted in favoring another applicant from a disfavored
group. The proof at the liability stage of the trial would be un-
affected, and there is no reason to believe that a representative of
both groups would have an incentive to push one claim any more
vigorously than another.1' Any potential conflict is more likely to
appear at the remedial stage of the trial. The relief sought in such a
161 Id.
'" Id. at 435.
113 See id. See also Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (subclassfng
may be appropriate if conflict ripens in a securities case).
"I For a related argument, discussing the interaction between the due process concerns of
the federal class action rule and the broad purposes of antidiscrimination laws, see Note, Anti-
discrimination Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of
Rule 23(b)(2), 88 Yale L.J. 868, 878-91 (1979) [hereinafter Class Actions].
10 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
'66 See Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 512 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (bifurcation of
liability and relief phases, and subclassing in the latter, eliminates conflicts of interest); New-
berg, supra note 118, §§ 7984d, 7984e (vigorous prosecution assumed absent express showing of
dissatisfaction with named representatives).
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case might well bring a divergence of interests, so that once liability
has been found, subclassing may be desirable. 'i
B. Representation and Conflict with
Compound Groups
If compound groups are recognized as protected by the Act,
problems of class representation similar to those in double discrimina-
tion cases will emerge. If both double and compound discrimination
are alleged in a class complaint, one more layer of analysis is required
to determine whether the rule 23 requirements are met. The prereq-
uisites of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation
must be met with respect to the claims of the compound groups as
well as double groups. In the hypothetical case posed at the outset of
this Article, 61 for example, the defendant police department had
three hiring practices that disproportionately affected blacks, women,
and black women, respectively. As the previous section indicates, the
courts have split on whether a single black woman plaintiff could rep-
resent both the race and sex discrimination claims.' The require-
ments for representation of a compound discrimination claim have not
yet received judicial consideration.
If only compound discrimination is alleged, without double dis-
crimination claims, then no special rule 23 problems appear. If the
class consists only of black women, for example, and neither black
men nor white women are members of the class, then the claim is
identical to one based on race or sex alone.'" The compound group
is capable of subclassing only to the extent that a strictly racial or
sexual class would be.' There is no opportunity for the type of con-
flict and subclassing that occurs in the double discrimination setting
since compound discrimination claims reflect the impact on one dis-
tinct, protected group.172
1' In the hypothetical police department case, for example, when a court must decide
whether to enjoin use of any or all of the discriminatory hiring criteria, each of the subgroups of
black men, white women, and black women would have a particular interest in only one of the
hiring practices. Similarly, in a case seeking relief in the form of hiring quotas. relief satsfaetory
to one of the subgroups might be inadequate to redress the claims of the other subgroups.
1&S See text accompanying notes 6-12 supra.
'm See text accompanying notes 148-63 supra.
' See, e.g., Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills. Inc., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 337, 339. modified, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 326 (D.S.C. 1974).
171 Thus, subclassing may be necessary, for example, to separate types of claims such as
hiring discrimination and promotion discrimination. See, e.g.. Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 370, 375-76 (D.S.C. 1974); Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing Co., 8 Fair
Empl. Prae. Cas. 383, 385-86 (D.S.C. 1974); see text accompanying notes 139-42 supra.
'2r See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
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The more usual case, however, would involve claims of both
double and compound discrimination, as in the hypothetical police
hiring case. Jurisdictions applying a strict interpretation of the
Rodriguez same interest/same injury test ,71 may require separate class
representatives for the race and sex discrimination claims. A separate
class representative may also be required for the compound claim
because the injury suffered by black women excluded by the oral
interview is distinct from both the injury suffered by the black class
because of the written test and the injury suffered by the female class
because of the height requirement. A court that finds inherent con-
flict between black and female classes 14 may also find inherent
conflict between those classes and the compound group. In the hypo-
thetical police case, a subclass of black women may be necessary be-
cause black women might argue that they lost jobs that were gained
by black men and white women after the oral interview.
The extensive subclassing that may result in cases alleging both
double and compound discrimination could be very detrimental to
Title VII class litigation efforts. At the outset of a complex case, find-
ing named plaintiffs for each subgroup may not be easy. Moreover,
the addition of counsel for each subclass may be financially prohibi-
tive. The private enforcement provisions of the Act encourage litiga-
tion by "private attorneys general" who may be awarded attorneys
fees, 75 but the prospect of such an award after prevailing in litigation
does not solve the problem of bearing the costs of a suit at its outset.
Although the court must be mindful of the necessity of protecting
adequately the interests of all members of the plaintiff class, the court
also needs to be mindful of the broad purpose of Title VII to eradi-
cate discrimination, a purpose that suggests a policy favoring large
classes. 16
It has often been said that the rule 23 requirements are con-
strued liberally in Title VII cases precisely because of the broad pur-
poses of the Act. In Although Rodriguez teaches that a liberal reading
173 See text accompanying notes 134-46 supra.
174 E.g., Droughn v. FMC Corp., 74 F.R.D. 639, 643 (E.D. Pa, 1977).
'75 See Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1973); Wofford v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 473 (N.D. Cal. 1978); note 99 supra.
176 In Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Va. 1976), the district court
noted that the federal courts, as a matter of policy, are receptive to large classes in discrimina-
tion suits because of the goals of finality of claim adjudication and reduction of trial costs by
economies of scale. Id. at 352; see, e.g., Rich. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41
(10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
177 See Newberg, supra note 118, § 7984, at 1301; Class Actions, supra note 164, at 884-85.
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does not mean that these requirements can be ignored, ' - the prereq-
uisites for class representation were not met in that case because the
class representatives had not suffered the injury they were attempting
to redress.7 9 The Rodriguez decision should not prevent named
plaintiffs who have actually been injured from bringing suit on behalf
of all others similarly injured."" Striking a balance behveen excessive
subclassing and adequate safeguards for the class is difficult. Courts
should attempt that task very carefully. Although a conservative
approach to protecting interests by extensive subclassing may appear
to be a proper judicial strategy in complex cases, leaning too much in
that direction may have detrimental consequences for employment
discrimination litigation. "I
One solution to the problem of how much to subclass in double
and compound discrimination cases is to reserve the question of con-
flict until actual conflict appears. Actual conflict may appear in the
relief stage of the litigation, when subclassing is least detrimental to
the plaintiffs. In the hypothetical police case, no inherent conflict
among blacks, women, and black women exists in the liability stage.
Although some members of these groups may claim that they should
have received jobs that other minorities received, what is at issue is
the pattern of exclusion of each group, not a series of individual
claims.
Disparate impact analysis focuses on the disproportionate exclu-
sion of each group; the corresponding benefit to the opposing group
is collective, not individual. Although a different minority group may
possess some theoretical benefit, that group does not fit comfortably
into the role of antagonist when, along with another plaintiff sub-
group, it, too, demonstrably has been excluded from job opportun-
ities. That white men, white women, and black men collectively
benefit from the disproportionate exclusion of black women does not
necessarily mean that the claims of black men conflict wvith those of
black women when black men are also underrepresented in the work
force.
Nor does the collective benefit necessarily mean that a single
class representative of the groups of blacks, women, and black
women would fail to oppose vigorously' -2 the discriminatory hiring
1,h 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977).
1id. at 403-04.
' See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420. 433 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Class Ac-
tions, supra note 164, at 882-83 n.80.
" See Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670. 675 (D. Md. 1979).
112 See Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1973).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1980]
HeinOnline -- 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 833 1980
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
practices that led to the exclusion of any of these groups, so long as
that representative had actually suffered from those discriminatory
practices. Since a judgment finding any one of the forms of discrim-
ination would benefit the named plaintiff's subgroup, the representa-
tive could be expected to oppose each form of discrimination with
vigor.
At the relief stage of litigation, actual conflict among such groups
becomes more obvious and likely.' S Affirmative relief in the form of
enjoining the use of particular selection procedures, ordering affirma-
tive action, or setting temporary quotas may produce conflicts, and
subclassing may be necessary to protect the interests of each group.
Similarly, in a case alleging double and compound discrimination in
pay, divergent interests may influence setting a formula for determin-
ing individual entitlements. Subclassing at that stage may, therefore,
be warranted.
Postponing subclassing until the relief stage protects the interests
of all class members at the point at which actual conflict arises, with-
out creating as great a burden on the plaintiffs as does subclassing at
the outset of the litigation. Once liability has been established, find-
ing both individuals willing to be named plaintiffs for particular sub-
classes and additional counsel is less difficult. In many cases, conflict
may never arise at any stage of the litigation, so that subclassing may
be unnecessary. If and when subclasses are formed, however, the
court should take care to form only as many subclasses as existing
evidence suggests are absolutely necessary.
CONCLUSION
Exclusionary employment practices cannot always be classified
easily as discrimination based solely on sex, race, or national
origin."M The simple dichotomies of male/female or black/white are
I~ See note 165 supra.
' Conflicts among groups seeking equal employment opportunities have been noted in re-
cent years by the press. A 1979 article, for example, quotes a representative of the Urban
Coalition as saying that blacks believe that most employers would prefer a white woman to a
black male if forced to choose one or the other. Moreover, the article notes that a predominant-
ly black group of women who were being trained as electromechanics found considerable resis-
tance when competing for jobs with black men. Roberts, Blacks and Women Clash on Access to
Jobs and Aid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1979, at A10, col. 1. In an earlier article on the same
subject, a representative of the Women's Equity Action League noted the existence of tension
between minorities and women, and observed that statistics show that as a group, women earn
much less than black men earn. A Catholic priest who is a sociologist said that Eastern and
Southern European ethnic groups have been underrepresented in positions of responsibility.
He added that although these groups have been victims of discrimination, the government
neither collects data on their unemployment nor creates special programs such as those made
available to racial minorities and women. Reinhold, Government Expands 'Minority' Definition;
Some Groups Protest, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1978, § 1 at 1, col. 6.
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often insufficient to describe the unique problems faced by compound
groups such as black women or Asian-American men. The purpose of
Title VII is to eradicate discrimination in employment on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," and it should be inter-
preted to prohibit the unjustified exclusion of compound groups as
well as unjustified exclusion on the basis of a single characteristic.
Title VII cases alleging double discrimination are distinguishable
from those involving compound discrimination. Double discrimination
occurs when an employer's practices disproportionately exclude two
groups, such as blacks and women. Compound discrimination,
however, is the disproportionate exclusion of a group formed by the
interaction of two groups, such as black women. There may be no
discrimination based strictly on either race or sex if an employer hires
large numbers of black men and white women, but the effect of that
kind of disproportionate hiring may be the exclusion of black women.
This Article has argued that Congress intended the Act to pro-
hibit intentional discrimination against compound groups. Many
courts have assumed that intentional discrimination against such
groups is covered by Title VII. The more difficult question is whether
disparate impact analysis should be applied to compound groups. This
Article has maintained that it should be, although some safeguards
should be adopted to prevent unfairness to defendants. One of those
safeguards is a limitation on the manner of statistical proof so that a
plaintiff does not have boundless opportunities to manipulate data to
find a significant result. In addition, Title VII should not be inter-
preted to prohibit disparate impact against groups formed by the
interaction of more than two characteristics, such as young black
Catholic men. Overt discrimination against such groups should be
prohibited, but policy dictates that disparate impact analysis should
not be applied: it would subject defendants to numerous suits and
virtually unlimited liability while enhancing the possibility of unjus-
tifiable applications of statistical proof.
Finally, this Article has suggested that courts allow class actions
alleging double and compound discrimination to proceed through the
liability phase of the trial without automatic subclassing. Problems of
antagonism and conflict may emerge; when that happens, subclassing
is clearly required under rule 23. Courts should not assume that con-
flict is inherent in such cases, however, and they should not require
subelassing until actual conflict is apparent. Actual conflict is likely to
occur only at the relief stage of compound discrimination claims that
are combined with one or more single-dimension claims. Automatic
subclassing fractionalizes claims to the point of discouraging the kind
of broad-based employment discrimination actions that specifically
were encouraged by the private enforcement provisions of Title VII.
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The problems of compound discrimination have not yet been
widely litigated. To the contrary, the question whether compound
discrimination is prohibited by the Act is just now emerging in the
courts. The issues presented by compound discrimination claims are
likely to arise more often in the next few years as Title VII litigation
poses the new and tougher questions typical of maturing law. These
issues should be resolved in a manner that will promote fully the
broad purposes of the Act while protecting employers from exposure
to unfair employment discrimination suits.
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